Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Furniture Distribution Center v. M. Vaughn Bitner :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rodney G. Snow; Stephen B. Doxey; Clyde, Pratt and Snow; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Ronald C. Wolthuis; David O. Black; Hatch, Morton and Skeen; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Furniture Distribution Center v. Bitner, No. 900033.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2848

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

4\ ~\

MCUMFNT
KFU
<py \l 45.9
SOCKET NO.

UTAH SUPREME COU.vT
GRIEF

t&0 ix
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FURNITURE DISTRIBUTION
CENTER, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff - Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No. 900033

vs.
M. VAUGHN BITNER; BARRY LYNN
BURKINSHAW; GEORGE H. MARX;
ANN P. MILES; SUMMIT COUNTY,
political subdivision of the
State of Utah; and JOHN DOES
through 10,

Priority No. 16

Defendants - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD UDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATTE OF UTAH
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON , JUDGE

Rodney G. Snow (3028)
Stephen B. Doxey (4560)
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff Respondent
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 322-2516

Ronald C. Wolthuis (4699)
David q. Black (0346)
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
Attorneys for Defendant Appellant, Ann P. Miles
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 6 0 0
Salt Lake City, §**#§ 8<
Telephone (801) lPS#-loo|

APR 1 t *HJ
Clerk, Supreme Court. Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FURNITURE DISTRIBUTION
CENTER, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff - Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No. 900033

vs.
M. VAUGHN BITNER; BARRY LYNN
BURKINSHAW; GEORGE H. MARX;
ANN P. MILES; SUMMIT COUNTY,
political subdivision of the
State of Utah; and JOHN DOES
through 10,

Priority No. 16

Defendants - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE

Rodney G. Snow (3028)
Stephen B. Doxey (4560)
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff Respondent
2 00 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 322-2516

Ronald C. Wolthuis (4699)
David O. Black (0346)
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
Attorneys for Defendant Appellant, Ann P. Miles
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone (801) 484-3000

Hatch, Morton & Skeen, attorneys for Appellant Ann P. Miles,
respectfully submit Appellant's Brief.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PARTIES IN THE PROCEEDING BELOW
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
STATEMENTS OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING

1
2, 3
4

BELOW
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

4

DETERMINATIVE RULE:

6

RULE 56c UTAH RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT
A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION
OF THE UTAH STATUTES GOVERNING NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO A TAX SALE
B. THE NOTICE TO FDC WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY
ADEQUATE AND THEREFORE THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN DETERMINING THAT THE TAX SALE OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS VOID
C. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT, THE TAX
DEED CLAIMANT, IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT

11
11

CONCLUSION

23

EXHIBITS

16

20

I.
PARTIES IN THE PROCEEDING BELOW
The parties to the proceeding below were:
Furniture Distribution Center:

Plaintiff - Respondent

Ann P. Miles:

Defendant - Appellant

M. Vaughn Bitner

Defendant

Barry Lynn Burkinshaw:

Defendant

George H. Marx:

Defendant

Summit County, State of Utah:

Defendant

II
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cased cited
Conder v. A.L. Williams & A s s o c , Inc.,
739 P.2d 634, (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
Fivas v. Petersen,
300 P.2d 635 (Utah 1956),
Frisbee v. KNK Construction Co.,
676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984)
Geneva Pipe Co. v. S. & H. Ins. Co.,
714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986)
Hansen v. Burris,
46 P.2d 400 (Utah 1935)
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950)
Mennonite Board of Misssions v. Adams,
462 U.S. 791 (1983)

Authorities cited
G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Financfe
Law, §3.26 (2d ed. 1985).
72 Am. Jur. 2d State And Local Taxation,
§739 (1974).

Statutes cited
Rule 3(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Utah Code Ann. §17-21-22 (1953) as amended
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-303 (1953) as amende^
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-310 (1953) as amende4

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1317 (1953) as amended

14

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1336 (1953) as amended

17

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1343 (1953) as amended

15

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1351 (1953) as amended

17

III.
STATEMENTS OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The isstif

( ))

-

.
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^:.uei

i. n -

^ **
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;oi,rt

irteroretation of the ]>t*\^ -refutes aoverri^a
I II1

(?)

S d 11.

whether

.i

r*

*•

^s

erred
notice

in

its

requirements

;

-nt.tled

to

notice

of

the

assessment of taxes and the final tax sale and, if so, whether
the notice to FDC was constitutionally adequate.
(3)

whether

the

lower

court

committed

error

in

granting summary judgment against the tax deed claimant in view
of the existence of genuine issues of material facts.
NOTE:

The issues cannot be defined more precisely than

above at this time inasmuch as there was no hearing on the Motion
for Summary Judgment.

There are no findings of fact, and the

Order entered by the District Court is not specific as to reasons
or facts relied upon for the summary judgment.

Although various

arguments and facts were suggested in the Memorandums in Support
and Opposition to Summary Judgment, and in the pleadings, it is
unknown which, if any were relied on by the lower court.

Without

such information, to speculate or to list every potential item
mentioned in the record as a possibility would unduly burden this
Brief.

Appellant believes that the specific common denominator

running through all possible issues is the question of whether
the Respondent was entitled to notice of taxes due and, if so,
whether it received adequate notice of taxes due on the subject
property and the subsequent tax sale of the property, or if it
was entitled, as it suggests, to more specific notice.

If the

notice to the Respondent was adequate, as Appellant urges, under
the statutes and precedents cited hereafter, the summary judgment
should be reversed and the Appellant restored to her record title
of the subject property as a matter of law.
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[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith
if the p] eadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issues as
to any material fact and that the moving party is enti tied

to judgment as a matter of law "'
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS
1.

This case involves uie c -

Land in Summit County known *e
more particularly described K

Lot

J/

>ta^ecoach Esta

Summit county's Plat r *^.-

Co] cimencing a t a p^xi^ nui, ch 139
.
4357.86 feet of the S.E. corner of Se; * .on
1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
running thence '-^^h A^ ieqrrcr> * ** ' A-

xet^ aiiu wesc
32, Township
Meridian and
" • *2 56.?s

n.

feet; thence South 40 degrees 3 0 ft. East 384.71 feet;
thence North 44 degrees 00 ft. East 12 02.27 feet;
thence North 31 degrees 51 ft. West 372.25 feet to
beginning.
(Complaint, R. 2-3).
2.

On

or

about

November

30,

1978, M.

Vaughn

Bitner

("Bitner'1 Co-Defendant in lower court proceeding), owner of the
subject

property

Burkinshaw

quit-claimed

("Burkinshaw"

proceeding).
Plaintiff's

-

his

interest

Co-defendant

to
in

Barry

Lynn

lower

court

(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment

[hereinafter

referred to as Plaintiff's Memo.], Exhibit D, R. 211).
3.

Respondent

FDC entered
referred

to

into a Uniform

Contract

(hereinafter

as UREC)

property

from Burkinshaw on September 13, 1979.

Real

Estate

to purchase

said

(Complaint,

Exhibit A, R. 10).
4.

FDC recorded a "Notice of Contract" with the Summit

County Recorder's office.
5.

(Complaint, Exhibit B, R. 12).

Property taxes had been assessed on the property as

early as 1978 and had been paid.

At the time of closing on the

contract between Burkinshaw and FDC, the taxes on the property
were prorated.
6.

In

assessments.
7.

(Complaint, Exhibit B, R. 11, See #12).
the

UREC

FDC

agreed

to

pay

any

future

tax

(Complaint, Exhibit B, R. 10, See #11).

In the title insurance policy issued to Burkinshaw and

FDC by Granite Title Company, a notation was made that the 1978
taxes had been paid and the 1979 taxes had been assessed on the
property and appeared as a lien, but were not yet due.

(Exhibit

A

a t t -.T..-

.:- •

8.

firough

Taxes f o r

1983 w e r e

never

paid.

Tax

n o t i r._ -

in

- f,i r p «t*

the i-ropcii

:he

. t

taxes.

? laintiff f s Me me .

Exhibit _,
9.

uned

I

Sumi" J t '„' ujiil y ' . > > r>« p j i. e

about t h e property taxes b u t were told that t h e ti tie work on the
propertv h a d n o t y e t been completed
liable

:or payment

^1~ tl i a t a x e s •

and therefore F D C w a s it u i)t
Summ.it Conn:

lenied

this.

(Complaint . -. 3; ^.L dint if f' s M e m o . , Exhibit C, R
10 •

T h e property

was pi irehased

preliminary tax sale for non-payment
(Plaintiff's Memo , Exh ib:4- •
11.

ty

Summ

: general -axe.- *
^,210).

Nc • tic: .e of the fii tal sal e • ::: f the property for delinquent

taxes w a s placed in t h e newspaper (Summit County Bee) as required
(Plaintiff 1 s Memc

by statute
12
the

owner

Notice of t h e f i nal tax bene w a ^ mailer, certified, t o
o f record,

Exhib.if, r i

13.

:i 8 ;

11

2 :):i

Vaughn

Bitner.

(Plaintiff's

Memo.,

: s •) .

T h e property w a s subsequent! y so] d at t h e t a x sale on

May 2 4 , 19 8 4

Bitner purchased t h e property **: * -<* tax sal •=* ana

reeei 1 red a Tax: Dee
] 4,

Ex

(I:: ] a i nt :i ff" s

On or about October 2 9 , 19b« s 3itner quit-claimed his

interest to Appellant M i l e s .

She rec~~i£.i :?r deed M-

, . oerty taxes from 198 i through 1981::

; ,eiiance .. •

er .-^-n

title, she placed a dwelling * un the property and h a s made _trier

improvements and has been in quiet use and enjoyment of the
property since 1984,

(Complaint, R. 4; Defendant Miles Answer,

R. 33) .
15.

FDC claimed that they were entitled to receive notice

of the tax assessments and tax sale, and because they did not
receive notice, that the tax sale was void.
16.

Summit

County

in the

"Notice of Contract" was "insufficient to

description

has

indicated

(Complaint, R. 4 ) .

describe any parcel of property whatsoever."

that

the

property

(Plaintiff's Memo.,

Exhibit C, R. 185) .

VIII.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant contends that Plaintiff was not entitled to notice
of the assessment of taxes or of the final tax sale.
filing

of

a

"Notice of Contract" alone was

Plaintiff's

insufficient

to

require Summit County to include it as a "claimant of record" for
assessment purposes.

Having not filed a request for notice with

the

as

county

assessor

required

by

law, Plaintiff

was

not

entitled to notice of the assessment of taxes or of the final tax
sale.
It is further the Appellant's position that FDC had many
notices that taxes had been assessed on the property and were due
and payable.

The taxes were prorated at the time of closing.

The title insurance policy from Granite Title Company indicated
that the

1978 taxes had been paid, and the 1979 taxes were

assessed.

In the UREC, FDC agreed to be responsible for payment

of any future taxes on the property.

Plaintiff made no tender of

any taxes nor any request for tax notices to be sent to it.

They

purchased the property from Burkinshaw in September of 1979. They
paid no taxes and took no action on this property until this suit
was initiated

on April 11, 1988, some seven years and eight

months after the property was purchased.
The notice

to FDC that taxes had been assessed

property, and the notice published

on the

in the newspaper that the

property was to be sold for delinquent taxes was all of the
notice that FDC was entitled to under the circumstances.

Simply

recording

County

the

"Notice

of

Contract"

with

the

Summit

Recorderfs office did not entitle FDC to personal notification or
notice by mail of yearly tax assessments or the final tax sale.
Had FDC wanted notice of the assessment of taxes and final tax
sale, it would merely have had to make such a request of the
county assessor as provided by law.

Because notice to FDC was

adequate, and the final tax sale was held in compliance with Utah
statutes, the lower court erred in granting summary judgment to
FDC and in declaring the final tax sale and subsequent conveyance
to Appellant void.

The lower court erred in quieting title to

the property in FDC.
Finally,

sufficient

issues

of

material

fact

existed

pertaining to FDC's status as a claimant in the property and
required notice which would preclude summary judgment.

IX.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE
UTAH STATUTES GOVERNING NOTICE REQUIREMENTS PRIOR
TO A TAX SALE.

(Because

this

case

stems

from

the

collection

of

taxes

imposed from 1979 - 1984, and the property was deeded to Summit
County and subsequently sold for delinquent taxes in 1984, the
applicable statutes contained in Utah Code Ann. §17-21-6 through
§17-21-22 and §59-2-301 through
revised.

The

revisions

§59-2-1351 have been slightly

are minor, however,

changes in the statute numbering.

are mostly

The applicable statutes have

not changed in substance during this time.
will be noted in the argument.

and

Any numbering changes

Citations to the statutes will be

to the most recent version.)
FDC recorded a "Notice of Contract" with the Summit County
Recorder when it purchased the subject property from Burkinshaw
pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract (UREC) in September,
1979.

(R. 12).

FDC contends that because of this, they should

have received personal notice or notice by mail of the yearly tax
assessments and the subsequent final tax sale.

The "Notice of

Contract" was indeed a recordable document and was duly recorded
by the County Recorder.
required

to

notify

However, the County Recorder is not

the County

Assessor

or Treasurer

of all

persons who have a recorded interest in a piece of property.
In Utah, the Recorder's duties are set forth in Utah Code
Ann.

§17-21-6

through

§17-21-22

(1953)

as

amended.

These

sections have not been substantively changed since 1979.
Recorder

is

to

keep

indexes

of

all

recorded

The

documents,

encumbrances, conveyances, deeds and mortgages and an index to
recorded maps, plats and subdivisions.

Utah Code Ann. §17-21-22

(1953) as amended provides in pertinent part
[t]he county recorder shall each year prepare copies of
said ownership maps and plats and descriptions, showing
record owners at noon on January 1, and shall, on or
before January 15 of each year, transmit the copies to
the county assessor, but all changes in recorded ownership of real property . . . shall be reported by the
county recorder to the county assessor .... "
(Emphasis added).

The County Recorder delivers the plat books to

the assessor for the tax assessments to be made.

The record

owner referred to in the statute is the person who holds legal
title to the property.

Because the seller in an installment land

contract typically retains the legal title to the property until
all payments have been made, the seller's name remains on the
plat books as the record owner of the property, and the yearly
assessments continue to be mailed to him.

It is only after all

of the installment payments have been made on a land contract
that the title to the property is transferred to the buyer.

See

generally, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, §3.26
(2nd ed. 1985).
The County Assessor's duties are set forth in Utah Code Ann.
Title 59.
1979.

The substance of these sections has not changed since

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-303 (1953) as amended (formerly §59-

5-4) provides in pertinent part

(1) Prior to May 22 each year, the county assessor
shall ascertain the names of the owners of all property
which is subject to taxation by the county and shall
assess the property to the owner, claimant of record,
or occupant in possession or control ...
No mistake
in the name or address of the owner or supposed owner
of property renders the assessment invalid.
Persons who are not the record owners (title holders), yet
wish to be assessed for taxes or have the tax assessments sent to
them may make a request to the assessor that they be listed as
"claimant to receive notice."
amended

(formerly

§59-5-18)

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-310 (1953) as
provides

that

"[r]eal

property

described on the assessment book need not be described a second
time, but any person claiming the real property and a desire to
be assessed for the land may have the person's name inserted with
that of the person to whom the real property is assessed."

Thus,

tax assessment notices and notice of final tax sale will also be
sent to such claimants as well as the title holder.
Respondent FDC should have made a request to the Assessor to
be listed as the a claimant on the subject property if it wanted
to receive notice of the tax assessments.

Simply recording a

"Notice of Contract" in the Recorder's office will not accomplish
this.

The Assessor is entitled to rely on the list of record

owners (title holders) as supplied to him by the Recorder.

Since

the Recorder only makes a change on the plat books when there is
a change in the title holder, this would not occur in a UREC
where a seller retains possession of the legal title.

Utah Code

Ann. §17-21-22 (1953) as amended.
Once

the

assessment

roll

has

been

completed,

it

is

transferred
collection
amended

by
of

the

Assessor

taxes.

(formerly

to

Utah

the

Code

§59-2-1309

in

County

Ann.
1987

Treasurer

§59-2-1317
and

for
(1953)

§59-10-10

in

the
as

1979)

provides in pertinent part
(1) Upon receipt of the assessment roll, the county
treasurer shall index the names of all property owners
shown by the assessment roll ....
(2) The treasurer shall proceed to collect the taxes
and furnish to each taxpayer ... by mail, postage
prepaid, or leave at the taxpayer's residence or usual
place of business, if known, a notice containing the
(a) kind and valuation of property assessed to the
taxpayer ...
(3) If the property has been preliminarily sold for a
prior tax within a period of four years and has not
been redeemed, the treasurer shall stamp on the notice
"Prior taxes are delinquent on this parcel. Final tax
sale pending."...
Consequently, the only person who receives the notice of tax
assessment is the person whose name is listed on the Assessor's
rolls as the owner or taxpayer.
holder of the legal title.
And

Local

Taxation

§739

This person is generally the

See generally, 72 Am. Jur. 2d State
(1974).

Unless the buyer

in a land

contract notifies the assessor to include its name along with the
record title holder, its name is not on the assessment roll and
it will not get notice of the tax assessments or notice of final
tax sale mailed to it.
1956) , this

court

In Fivas v. Petersen, 300 P.2d 635 (Utah

indicated

that

the

Assessor

need

look

no

further than the information given to him by the County Recorder
unless there is no address listed for the record owner of the
property.

If no address is listed, the Assessor must examine the

county records to ascertain such address.

Id. at 635.

In the case at bar, there was a record owner and address
listed for the property.

The Summit County Assessor did not have

to look any further.

Tax notices on the property were mailed to

the owner of record.

(R. 197-200).

law were met.

All requirements imposed by

FDC has no one to blame but itself for failing to

pay the taxes assessed and failing to request notice of the taxes
from the Assessor.
Once the notice has been given as required by statute, and
the sale has been held, the tax title is a new and paramount
title which totally destroys the prior title.
When the period of redemption has expired and the
county has received a tax deed for any real estate sold
for delinquent taxes, the county tax lien merges into
the title as effectively as by execution sale with such
further rights of redemption as the statute provides.
Purchasers from the county then take with a new and
complete title in the land, under an independent grant
from the sovereign authority, which bars or
extinguishes all prior titles and encumbrances of
private persons and all equities arising out of them.
Hansen v. Burris, 46 P. 2d 400 (Utah 1935).

The obvious reason

for such strong language with regard to tax deeds is to ensure
finality and stability in tax titles.

It would be difficult to

sell property at tax sales if such sales could be attacked for
minimal reasons.

The payment of taxes is absolutely essential to

the maintenance of government.

The Respondent's failure to pay

taxes for over four years prior to the preliminary tax sale and
for over four years subsequent to the sale does violence to the
collection of taxes and finality of tax sales.

In Utah, there is

a four year period of redemption allowed to delinquent property
taxpayers.

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1343 (1953) as amended.

If four

years have passed without taxes being paid, it is in the best
interest of the State and County to sell the property and to
collect the tax due.
B.

THE NOTICE TO FDC WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE AND
THEREFORE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
TAX SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS VOID.

At the time FDC purchased the property they had notice that
taxes had been assessed on the property, and would continue to be
assessed.

FDC purchased the property on September 13, 1979.

1978 taxes had been assessed and paid by Bitner.

The

At the time of

the closing on the contract between Burkinshaw and FDC, the 1979
taxes on the property were prorated.

(R. 11, See #12) .

UREC, FDC agreed to pay any future tax assessments.
#11) .

In the

(R. 10, See

FDC had additional notice that taxes had been assessed in

the title insurance policy issued to it by Granite Title Company
in which a notation was made that the 1978 taxes had been paid,
and that the 1979 taxes had been assessed on the property and
appeared as a lien but were not yet due.
attached hereto).

(See Exhibit "A11

FDC was fully aware that taxes would be due

each year on the property and was not entitled to any further
written notice

of the annual

assessment

unless

requested

as

outlined in the previous section.
Prior to the tax sale of the subject property, notice of the
final tax sale, including a list of the property to be sold, was
published

in the Summit County Bee,

Summit County.)

(newspaper circulated in

(R. 218). Furthermore, the owner of record, as

required by law, was given notice of the sale by certified mail.

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1351 (1953) as amended.
No further notice is required.

(R. 187, 201-209).

Once the property was sold to the

County by operation of law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-2-13 3 6
(1953) as amended, each tax notice

for the subsequent years

stated that the property had been sold and was subject to a final
sale.

(See R. 197-199).

Had FDC properly requested notice from

the Assessor by filing as a claimant as provided, FDC would have
had ample opportunity to pay the taxes and protect its interest.
Because FDC received several notices that taxes had been
assessed on the property at the time of their purchase, and FDC,
was responsible for paying the taxes and could have protected its
interest by

requesting

notice

from the Assessor, and

Summit

County published notice of the final tax sale in the newspaper,
FDC was not denied its constitutional due process rights.
notices were constitutionally
sale was proper.

The

adequate, and therefore the tax

The lower court order declaring the tax sale

void should be overturned and the property restored to Appellant.
The U. S. Supreme Court has addressed the issue of notice in
two due process cases; Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 3 39
U.S. 306 (1950) and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462
U.S. 791 (1983).

In Mullane, the issue concerned the sufficiency

of notice to beneficiaries of a trust fund established under New
York banking law.

Notice of a judicial settlement of accounts

was

a

published

Although

in

Central

local

Hanover

newspaper.
had

339

addresses

beneficiaries, no mailed notices were sent.

U.S.
for

at

some

309-10.
of

the

The Court was concerned about notice to the beneficiaries,
both residents and non-residents, who would not have previous
knowledge of such proceedings.

Such persons would therefore, not

be on the alert to watch for a newspaper notice in New York.

The

Court said that mailed notice was required to all persons whose
names and addresses were reasonably ascertainable.

Id. at 318-

19.
Because the property

rights

in Mullane were intangible,

personal notification or mailed notice was important.

On a case

such as the one at bar, with a real property interest, owners
tend to make themselves aware of any attack on their ownership
rights.

Id. at 316.

Property owners understand that taxes are

assessed and due annually, and failure to pay them results in
forfeiture of the property.
In Mennonite, a mortgage bank was not notified when the
owner of a piece of property

(on whicfc they had a security

interest) failed to pay the taxes on the property.
was subsequently sold for taxes.

The property

462 U.S. at 794-95.

The Court

held that the bank should have received mailed notice.

Id. at

800.
Indeed, when one holds a property

interest such as the

mortgagee in Mennonite, it makes good sense to insure that they
receive

adequate

interest.

notice

of

actions

affecting

their

property

The mortgagee in Mennonite, was at the mercy of the

property owner to pay the taxes on the property.

If unpaid, the

mortgagee would not be aware of any arrearages or tax sales

without personal or mailed notice.
In Mennonite, the mortgagee was not required to pay the
taxes, the owner was.

Therefore, the mortgagee was not aware if

taxes had been paid.

In fact, the owner continued to make his

mortgage payments to the mortgagee

even after the sale, leaving

the mortgagee with a false sense of security.

Because of this,

the mortgagee was entitled to mailed notice.
In the current matter, FDC was the party responsible for
payment of taxes.

They already had notice that taxes were and

would continue to be assessed, and they were also aware of their
obligation to pay them.
for by

If FDC had requested notice, as provided

law, the Assessor would have listed FDC's name as a

claimant

to

the

property

and

it would

have

received

mailed

notice.

It was FDC's own failure to fulfill its obligation to

pay the taxes that resulted in the tax sale of the property, not
the failure of any third party as in Mennonite or Mullane.
Both

Mullane

and

Mennonite

held

that

notice

in

their

specific cases should be sent to those persons whose name and
addresses are reasonably ascertainable.

Assuming arguendo that

Summit County tried to mail notice to FDC, they would not have
succeeded.
descriptions

Summit
listed

County
on

the

indicates
"Notice

of

that

the

Contract"

property
were

not

accurate, and could not be successfully matched to any property
on the tax rolls at the time of FDC's purchase in 1979.
Summit County's Answer
Defense that:

(R. 20) they

indicate

In

in their Third

Stagecoach Estates Plat C is not now, nor has it
ever been a dedicated legal subdivision in Summit
County, State of Utah.
The legal description,
contained on any of the Plaintiff's documents recorded
in the Summit County Recorder's Office is legally
insufficient to describe any piece of real property
whatsoever, and as such is void.
In Summit County's response to FDC's Interrogatories

(R. 185)

they indicated:
...[T]here was no Stagecoach Estates Plat "C" on
file in the Summit County Recorder's Office until 1987.
Accordingly, throughout the time in question, any
reference to Lot 5 Stagecoach Estates Plat "C" would
have been an indefinite description. Additionally, the
metes and bounds description contained in the Notice of
Contract is vague and indefinite and does not close.
As a result, reference to either description was
insufficient to describe any parcel of property
whatsoever.
Because of this, mailed notice, or any personal notice from
Summit County to FDC would have been impossible.
C.

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT, THE TAX DEED CLAIMANT,
IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACTS.

The sale of the subject property from Burkinshaw to FDC was
pursuant to a UREC.

"In such contracts, the vendor retains legal

title until the final payment is made, at which time full title
is conveyed to the vendee."

G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate

Finance Law, §3.26 (2d ed. 1985).

FDC had notice in the contract

that taxes had been assessed on the property.

When they made the

down payment and signed the contract the taxes were prorated
accordingly.

(R. 11).

A second notice to FDC that taxes had been assessed on the
property came in the title insurance policy issued to Plaintiff

by Granite Title Company.

In this policy, there was a notation

that the 1978 taxes had been paid and that the 1979 taxes had
been

assessed

hereto).

but were

not yet due.

(Exhibit

"A" attached

A third notice that FDC would be responsible for taxes

was contained in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the UREC. FDC agreed to
be responsible for the payment of any future taxes.

(R. 10).

Despite all of this, FDC claims that it did not know that taxes
had been assessed on the property.

It is hard to believe that

anyone purchasing property, no matter how foolhardy or naive,
would not know that the property would be subject to taxation.
FDC claimed that its President called the Summit County Assessor
to inquire about the taxes and was told that the property had not
been platted, and therefore the taxes on the individual lots
could not be assessed.

Summit County denied this.

(R. 183).

Whether or not FDC had adequate notice that taxes had been
assessed on the property and that the property would be sold for
delinquent taxes is an issue of material fact.

Whether the

property description contained in the "Notice of Contract11 was
sufficient to describe the property so that if additional notice
was required, Summit County could have sent it, is also an issue
of material fact.

Because these factual issues were in dispute,

as is apparent from the pleadings on file, the lower court erred
in granting summary judgment.

Summary judgments should only be

granted when it appears "there is no reasonable probability that
the

party

moved

against

could

prevail."

Frisbee

Construction Co.r 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984).

v.

KNK

Utah Rules of

Civil

Procedure

appropriate

if

56(c)
the

indicates

pleadings,

that

"summary

depositions,

judgment

affidavits,

is
and

admissions submitted in a case show there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as

a matter of law."

In the case at bar there was a dispute as

to whether FDC had notice on the tax assessments on the property.
There was also a dispute as to whether FDC had notice of the tax
sale of the property, or if further notice was required, whether
it could have been sent.
pleadings

and

consideration

These disputes were set forth in the

memoranda
of

the

submitted
motion

to

for

the

summary

lower

court

judgment.

in
"In

considering a summary judgment motion, the court must evaluate
all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment."

Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc.,

739 P.2d

(Utah App. 1987).

634, 637

the facts presented by

Defendants in the pleadings, including answers to Interrogatories
and Affidavits indicated that FDC had notice that the taxes were
assessed and would be due, and FDC agreed to pay any further tax
assessments on the property.

FDC made no attempt to pay taxes

nor contact Appellant Miles until

1988 when this action was

instituted, even though Miles had been in possession of the
property since 1984.

Certainly in consideration of the dispute

about notice, and the

length of time that elapsed prior to

bringing

the

this

action,

lower

court,

in granting

summary

judgment to FDC, did not look at the facts in the light most

favorable to Defendant Miles who was opposing the motion.
appeal

from

summary

judgment,

[the

Supreme

Court]

"On

review[s]

evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party,"

Geneva

Pipe Co. v. S. & H. Insurance Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986).
Looking at the record in the light most favorable to Appellant,
the record

clearly

material fact.

shows the existence of genuine

issues of

Because of this the lower court erred in granting

summary judgment to FDC.

The decision of the lower court should

be reversed.
X.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is clear that FDC has failed to
protect its property

interest as provided by law and further

failed to pay its property taxes.

FDC was not entitled to any

further notice of tax assessment or final tax sale.
even

if FDC was

Furthermore,

entitled to notice, the notice provided by

publication was adequate under the circumstances.

In addition,

there were numerous disputed issues of material fact precluding
entry of summary judgment in this matter.

Consequently, the

lower court erred in granting summary judgment against Defendant
Miles and this Court should now reverse that judgment and remand
this case back to the/lower Court for further proceedings.
DATED this / ^ ^ d a y of April, 1990
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

TALD C. WOLTHUIS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant was mailed to Rodney G. Snow and Stephen B.
Doxey,

CLYDE

PRATT

& SNOW, Attorneys

for Plaintiff, at 200

American Savings Pla^a, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101 on this

/P ^

day of April, 1990y
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Tab A

AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION OWNERS POUCY-^Form B—1970

O-2-B-1970

(AnMiutod 10-17-70}

POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE
issued by

The Title Guarantee Company
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21202
JECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE PRO[ONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, THE TITLE GUARANTEE COMPANY, a Maryland
oration, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the
int of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay
under, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of:
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein;

a

2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title;
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land; or
4. Unmarketability of such title.

EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE

m

>llowing matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy:

m

Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances) restricting or
regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of the land, or regulating the character, dimensions or location of
any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in ownership or a reduction in the dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation of any such law, ordinance or governmental regulation.
Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police power unless notice of the exercise of such rights appears in the
public records at Date of Policy.
Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant; (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the insured claimant either at Date of
Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by this policy and not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured claimant became an insured hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss
or damage to the insured claimant; (d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy; or (e) resulting in loss or damage
which would not have been sustained if the insured claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured by this policy.

TNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this policy to be signed and sealed, to become valid when countersigned by a
ig officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws.

h .1

The Title Guarantee Company

GRANITE
^5pTLE CO.
i nniliRRH PLACE • 350 SOUTH 400 EAST

V THE *
TITL€
GUARANTEE

-COMPANY^ — / >o
ft

L T ^ K E C^UTAH S411! -PHONE (80^521-24.0 R

c£nr:-i

ATTEST

A

President

(M*O<<^XW$I^<^

Form OU-2-B-1970

\\ A of A A B

t3Bii<&3EaUU&<<M»*m£*am*ltlS»{ti,*JBS^
•OL1CY NUMBER:

OU

21453

DATE OF POLICY:

September 19r 1979

VALID ONLY IF SCHEDULES A 6c B ARE
ATTACHED TO ALTA 1970 OWNERS POLICY

POLICY INCLUDING RISK PREMIUM IS $

U1.00

SCHEDULE A

AMOUNT:

NAME OF INSURED

18,550,00

BARRY LYNN BURKINSHAW,
AND FURNITURE DISTRIBUTION CENTER
(As Their Interests May Appear)

HI
The estate or interest in the land described or identified herein and which is covered by this policy is:
Fee Simple and Contract
The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in:

BARRY LYNN BURKINSHAW
The land referred to in this policy is described or identified as follows:

Lot 5 Stagecoach Estates Plat C described as follows:
Commencing at a point
North 1392.47 feet and West 4357.86 feet of the S. E. comer of Section 32,
Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence
South 45°0f West 1256.38 feet; thence South 40°30f East 384.71 feet; thence
North 44°00f East 1202.27 fet; thence North 31°53f West 372.25 feet to
beginning.
Situate in Summit County, State of Utah

Order No. M-1778-79

POLICY NUMBER:
SCHEDULE B
OU 21453
This policy docs not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following:
PART

I

l- Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records.
2. Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof.
3. Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records.
A. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which a correct
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by the public records.
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water
rights, claims or title to water.
6. Possible unfiled mechanics' and materialmen's liens.
7. The dower, curtesy, homestead, community property, or other statutory marital rights, if any, of the spouse of any
individual Insured.

PAKT II

1. Taxes for the year 1979 accruing as a lien, not yet due.
year 1978 were paid. (Serial No.PSS 152-8)

Taxes for the

2. Trust Deed, dated September 3, 1976, in the amount of $61,000.00,
of First Security Bank of Utah, as Beneficiary, and Security Title, as
executed by M. Vaughn Bitner and Virginia Bitner, as Trustors,
September 13, 1976, in Book M 84 Page 64 as Entry No. 133414 of
records.

in favor
Trustee,
recorded
official

3. Unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated September 13, 1979, by and
between Barry Lynn Burklnshaw, as Seller, and Furniture Distribution Center, a
Utah corporation, as Buyer, creating the contract interest hereby insured.
4. Notice of Contract, dated September 13, 1979, shown as Item 3 above,
recorded September 18, 1979 in book M-141 Page 422 as Entry No. 159462 in the
office of the Summit County Recorder.
5. Subject to and together with a Right of Way 100 feet wide across the
property of Seller in Sections 29, 30, 31 and 32, Township 1 North, Range 4
East, Sections 5, 6, 8, 17 and 20, Township 1 South Range 4 East to provide
ingress and egress to Buyer's property.
6. Subject to a 50 foot Right of Way to allow ingress and egress of other
property owners and also said Lot is subject to a perpetual easement for
building, constructing and maintaining public or private utilities.
7. All Rights of Way are to be jointly maintained with other property
owners.
CONTINUED

signed:

GRANITE TITLE CO.

SCHEDULE B CONTINUED
8. Excluded from the real property transferred herewith are any and all
mineral rights whether surface or subsurface.
9. Seller expressly reserves any and all water rights, diligence rights for
water, whether surface or sub-surface, previously used by seller which may be
on or cross buyer's property.
10. Subject to and together with all Rights of Way necessary for access and as
recorded or provided in respect to any of Stagecoach Estates.
11. Subject to a 5 foot utility easement along the 384.71 foot course and
1256.38 foot course.

the

12. Subject to a 50 foot Right of Way for roads along the following courses:
North 31°53f West 372.25 feet.
13. Subject to and together with all rights of the Protective Covenants
recorded on Plat a Stagecoach Estates as Document # 111622 recorded August 21,
1970, Book M 27, Page 497, as fully as if said Protective Covenants were
recorded in respect to this property and with all rights relating thereto.
14. Subject to any possible boundary conflicts or encroachments revealed by a
survey or plat.
15.
Any assessments which may hereafter accrue in favor of Greenbelt
Assessments or any special assessments levied by the Weber Water Conservancy
District, Park City Fire Protection District, Snyderville
Basin
Sewer
Improvement District or the Summit County Special District No. 7.

CONDITIONS AND STD7ULATI0NS
Definition of Terms
The following terms when used in this policy mean
(a) insured the insured named in Schedule A, and, subject to anv
gnts or defenses the Company may have had against the named insured,
ose who succeed to the interest of such insured by operation of law as
stin*utshed from purchase including, but not limited to, heirs, distnbu
!*. devisees, survivors, personal representatives, next of kin, or corporate
fiduciary successors.
(b) "insured claimant *. an insured claiming loss or damage hereider.
(c) "knowledge* actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge or
rtice which may be imputed to an insured by reason of any public
cotds
(d) "land"* the land described, specifically or by reference in Schcde A, and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute real
operty, provided, however, the term land' does not include any propty beyond the lines of the area specifically described or referred to in
hedule A, nor any right, title, interest, estate or easement in abutting
-cctst roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or waterways, but nothing herein
all modify or limit the extent to which a right of access to and from the
id is insured by this policy
(e) "mortgage', mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other security
rtrument
(f) "public records' those records which by law impart construce notice of matters relating to said land
Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance of Title
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy
favor of an insured so long as such insured retains an estate or
erest in the land, or holds an indebtedness secured by a purchase money
>rtgage given by a purchaser from such insured, or so long as such
>ured shall have liability by reason of covenants of warranty made by
~h insured in any transfer or conveyance of such estate or interest, proled, however, this policy shall not continue in force in favor of any
rchaser from such insured of either said estate or interest or the inbtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured
Defense and Prosecution of Action*—Notice of Claim to be given
by an Injured Claimant
(a) The Company, at its own cost and without undue delay, shall
wide for the defense of an insured in all litigation consisting of actions
proceedings commenced against such insured, or a defense interposed
unst an insured in an action to enforce a contract for a sale of the
ate or interest in said land, to the extent that such litigation is founded
on an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or other matter insured against
this policy
(b) The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing (1) in
e any action or proceeding is begun or defense is interposed as set
th in (a) above, (11) in case knowledge shall come to an insured
eundcr of any claim of title or interest which is adverse to the title
the estate or interest as insured, and which might cause loss or damage
which the Company may be liable by virtue of this policy, or (in) if
e to the estate or interest, as insured, is rejected as unmarketable If such
>mpt notice shall not be given to the Company, then as to such insured
liability of the Company shall cease and terminate in regard to the
ttcr or matters for which such prompt notice is required provided,
vever that failure to notify shall in no case prejudice the rights of any
h insured under this policy unless the Company shall be prejudiced by
h failure and then only to the extent of such prejudice
(c) The Company shall have the right at its own cost to institute and
hout undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any
er act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish
title to the estate or interest as insured and the Company may take
appropriate action under the terms of this policy whether or not it
II
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(d) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or inter
posed a defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this policy,
the Company may pursue any such litigation to final determination by a
court of competent jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right, in its
sole discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or order
(e) In all cases where this policy permits or requires the Company to
prosecute or provide for the defense of any action or proceeding, the
insured hereunder shall secure to the Company the right to so prosecute
or provide defense in such action or proceeding, and all appeals therein,
and permit the Company to use, at its option, the name of such insured
for such purpose Whenever requested by the Company, such insured shall
give the Company all reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding, in
effecting settlement, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, or prosecuting
or defending such action or proceeding, and the Company shall reimburse
such insured for any expense so incurred
4. Notice of Loea—Limitation of Action
In addition to the notices required under paragraph 3(b) of these
Conditions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any loss or damage
for which it is claimed the Company is liable under this policy shall bt
furnished to the Company within 90 days after such loss or damage shall
have been determined and no right of action shall accrue to an insured
claimant until 30 days after such statement shall have been furnished
Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage shall terminate any
liability of the Company under this policy as to such loss or damage
5.

Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle for or in
the name or an insured claimant any daim insured against or to terminate
all liability and obligations of the Company hereunder by paying or
tendering payment of the amount of insurance under this policy together
with any costs, attorneys fees and expenses incurred up to the time of
such payment or tender of payment, by the insured claimant and
authorized by the Company
6. Determination and Payment of Loea
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall in no case
exceed the least of
(I)
the actual loss of the insured claimant, or
(u)
the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A
(b) The Company will pay, in addition to any loss insured against by
this policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation earned on by
the Company for such insured, and all costs, attorneys fees and expenses
in litigation earned on by such insured with the written authorization of
the Company
(c) When liability has been definitely fixed in accordance with the
conditions of this policy, the loss or damage shall be payable within 30
days thereafter
7. Limitation of Liability
N o claim shall arise or be maintainable under this oolicj (a) if the
Company, after having received notice of an alleged detect, lien or
encumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or otherwise, re
moves such defect, lien or encumbrance or establishes the title as insured,
within a reasonable time after receipt of such notice (b) in the event of
litigation until there has been a final determination by a court of com
petent jurisdiction, and disposition of all appeals therefrom adverse to
the title as insured as provided in paragraph 3 hereof, or (c) for liability
voluntarily assumed by an insured in settling any claim or suit without
prior written consent of the Company
8. Reduction of Liability
All payments under this policy, except payments made for costs
attorneys fees and expenses shall reduce the amount of the insurance pro
tanto No payment shall be made without producing this policy for en
dorsement of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, in
l n « « r\r A*<trurftnn <hal! he furnished to the

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS—Continued
9.

liability Noncumularive
It is expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this
policy shall be reduced by any amount the Company may pay under any
policy insuring either (a) a mortgage shown or referred to in Schedule B
hereof which is a lien on the estate or interest covered by this policy, or
(b) a mortgage hereafter executed by an insured which is a charge or
lien on the estate or interest described or referred to in Schedule A, and
the amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy. The
Company shall have the option to apply to the payment of any such
mortgages any amount that otherwise would be payable hereunder to the
insured owner of the estate or interest covered by this policy and the
amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy to said
insured owner.

been issued, and if requested by the Company, such insured clai
transfer to the Company ail rights and remedies against any
property necessary in order to perfect such right of subrogatioc
permit the Company to use the name of such insured claims
transaction or litigation involving such rights or remedies. If th
does not cover the loss of such insured claimant, the Com pan
subrogated to such rights and remedies in the proportion v
payment bears to the amount of said loss. If loss should result
act of such insured claimant, such act shall not void this polic
Company, in that event, shall be required to pty only that pi
losses insured against hereunder which shall exceed the amour;
lost to the Company by reason of the impairment of the
subrogation.

10. Apportionment
If the land described in Schedule A consists of two or more parcels
which are not used as a single site, and a loss is established aflecting one
or more of said parcels but not all, the loss shall be computed and settled
on a pro rata basis as if the amount of insurance under this policy was
divided pro rata as to the value on Date of Policy of each separate parcel
to the whole, exclusive of any improvements made subsequent to Date of
Policy, unless a liability or value has otherwise been agreed upon as to
each such parcel by the Company and the insured at the time of the
issuance of this policy and shown by an express statement herein or by
an endorsement attached hereto.

12. Liability Limited t o this Policy
This instrument together with all endorsements and other ins
if any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and
between the insured and the Company.
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligt
which arises out of the status of the title to the estate or interest
hereby or any action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to
visions and conditions and stipulations of this policy.
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made e
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signea by either the P
a Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validatin
or authorized signatory of the Company.

11. Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement
Whenever the Company shall have settled a claim under this policy, all
right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of
the insured claimant. The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled
to all rights and remedies which such insured claimant would have had
against any person or property in respect to such claim had this policy not

13. Notices, W h e r e Sent
All notices required to be given the Company and any statei
writing required to be furnished the Company shall be addre
it at its Home Omce, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.

This Policy is not transferable to a subsequent purchaser but should be retained by Insured for his protection aj
future loss under warranties or covenants of title. A Reissue Policy in favor of new purchaser should be obta
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17-21-22. Annual revision — Reporting changes in ownership to county assessors — Costs, how borne.
The county recorder shall, each year, prepare copies of ownership maps and
plats and descriptions, showing record owners at r)oon on J a n u a r y 1, and
shall, on or before J a n u a r y 15 of each year transmit the copies to the county
assessor, but all changes in recorded ownership of real property made during
the first seven months of each calendar year shall be reported by the county
recorder to the county assessor not later than August 15 of t h a t year and for
the remainder of the calendar year the changes in the ownership of real
property which are filed in the county recorder's office shall be reported each
month by the county recorder to the county assessor on or before the 15th day
of the month following the month in which the changes were recorded in the
office of the county recorder. These changes of ownership shall be transmitted
by the recorder's office to the assessor's office on appropriate forms furnished
by the recorder's office showing the current owner's name and a full legal
description of the property conveyed. In those cases where only a part of the
grantor's property is currently conveyed the recorder shall transmit an additional form showing a full legal description of the portion retained. The cost of
making copies of maps and plats and descriptions fcjr use of the assessor as
provided in this section shall be paid one-half by the dtate and one-half by the
county; but in any county having a taxable value for4 the current tax year of
less than $50,000,000, plats for the year may not exceed Y/< of the state, state
school, and state high school taxes levied in the county for the year; and in
any county having a taxable value of $50,000,000 or jnore for the current tax
year the state's portion of the cost of making and revising maps and plats may
not exceed V2of 1% of the total state, state school, and state high school taxes
levied in the county for the year.

59-2-303-

General duties of county assessor.

(1) Prior to May 22 each year, the county assessor shall ascertain the
names of the owners of all property which is subject to taxation by the county,
and shall assess the property to the owner, claimant of record, or occupant in
possession or control at 12 o'clock m. of J a n u a r y 1 ip the tax year, unless a
subsequent conveyance of ownership of the real property was recorded in the
office of the county recorder more t h a n 14 calendar days before the date of
mailing of the tax notice. In t h a t case, any tax notice may be mailed, and the
tax assessed, to the new owner. No mistake in the name or address of the
owner or supposed owner of property renders the Assessment invalid.
(2) Assessors shall become fully acquainted with kl\ property in their respective counties, and, either in person or by deputy, regularly update assessm e n t records in order to annually establish the values of the property they are
required to assess.

59-2-310- Assessment in name of claimant as well as
owner.
Real property described on the assessment book need not be described a
second time, but any person claiming the real property and a desire to be
assessed for the land may have the person's name inserted with t h a t of the
person to whom the real property is assessed.

59-2-1317. Index of property owners — Tax notice.
(1) Upon receipt of the assessment roll, the county treasurer shall index the
names of all property owners shown by the assessment roll. The commission
shall prescribe a form of index which shall be uniform in all the counties
throughout the state.
(2) The treasurer shall proceed to collect the taxes and furnish to each
taxpayer, except those taxpayers under Sections 59-2-1302 and 59-2-1307, by
mail, postage prepaid, or leave at the taxpayer's residence or usual place of
business, if known, a notice containing: (a) the kind and value of property
assessed to the taxpayer; (b) the street address of the property, where applicable; (c) the amount of tax levied: and (d) if no notice has been provided under
Section 59-2-919, the days fixed by the county board of equalization for hearing complaints. The notice shall set out the aggregate amount of taxes to be
paid for state, county, city, town, school, and other purposes.
(3) If the property has been preliminarily sold for a prior tax within a
period of four years and has not been redeemed, the treasurer shall stamp on
the notice 'Trior taxes are delinquent on this parcel. Final tax sale pending."
The notice shall set out separately all taxes levied only on a certain kind or
class of property for a special purpose or purposes, and shall have printed or
stamped on it the effective rate of taxation for each purpose for which taxes
have been levied, when and wrhere payable, the date the taxes will be delinquent, and the penalty provided by law.
(4) The notice shall be mailed at least ten days before the first day the
county board of equalization meets to hear complaints if no increase in the
certified tax rate is proposed, or by November 1 if an increase in the certified
tax rate is proposed under the procedures established in Section 59-2-919. The
notice shall be in duplicate form and the county treasurer need not mail out a
tax receipt acknowledging payment
(5) After notices have been mailed, the county treasurer shall make available the assessment roll, map books, and statements to the clerk of the county
board of equalization.

